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INTRODUCTION 
Ignorance about the filibuster is almost universal. What 
many people might know about the filibuster is based on the 
climax of the classic film, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, when 
Jimmy Stewart's character launches a filibuster to stop legisla-
tion that would usurp land on which he had hoped to build a 
special place for wayward boys. Some people might recall read-
ing in history about the use of the filibuster to block civil rights 
legislation, while it is possible that most literate Americans are 
familiar with the recent denunciations of the filibusters that have 
blocked floor votes on six of President George W. Bush's judicial 
nominations as "outrageous," "disgraceful," "unconstitutional," and 
nothing short of a violation of basic principles of democratic 
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I completed this Essay in 2003. At the time the Essay went to press in April 2005, 
there was widespread speculation that Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R.-Tenn., was 
planning to block the next attempted filibuster of a judicial nomination through a meas-
ure dubbed the "nuclear option" by the former Majority Leader, Republican Senator 
Trent Lott. Pursuant to this option, a simple majority of the Senate would be able to dis-
regard Senate Rule XXII, requiring a supermajority to invoke cloture against a filibuster. 
The focus of this Essay is not on the legality of the "nuclear option" but rather on the 
arguments for and against the constitutionality of the filibuster. The Essay does suggest, 
however, that the "nuclear option" is illegal and constitutes an unfortunate breach of the 
Senate's heretofore unbroken practice of amending its rules in strict accordance with its 
rules. Of course, the fate of the "nuclear option" does not have a direct bearing on the 
merits of the arguments favoring the constitutionality of the filibuster. As I attempt to 
make clear in this Essay, I believe those arguments to be both meritorious and compel-
ling, and they retain their legitimacy and force, regardless of the success of the "nuclear 
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445 
446 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:445 
government. 1 The denunciations fell short of their intended pur-
pose of embarrassing the senators responsible for the filibusters, 
much less of motivating the full Senate to consider the Senate 
Majority Leader's proposal to amend Senate Rules to allow only 
a simple m~ority rather than three-fifths, or 60, senators to end 
a filibuster. In the end, none of these fragmentary images nor 
the heated denunciations have enhanced popular understanding 
of the filibuster or the reasons for its longevity and constitution-
ality. 
This Essay addresses the basic arguments for and against 
the constitutionality of the filibuster. In spite of the fact that in-
tense debates over the constitutionality of the filibuster have 
been front page news and intensely divided the Senate through-
out 2003,3 very few legal scholars have devoted serious attention 
to the filibuster. 4 Determining the constitutionality C'f the filibus-
ter is, however, by no means easy. It requires analyzing surpris-
ingly complex problems within the legislative process. These in-
clude, inter alia, making sense of majority rule within the 
legislative process; the limits to the Senate's discretion in formu-
lating internal rules; the Senate's unique structure and organiza-
tion; and how the filibuster may alter the balance of power 
within the Senate and between the Senate and other institutions, 
including the presidency and the federal judiciary. Assessing the 
constitutionality of the filibuster further requires determining 
whether any Senate rule violates "anti-entrenchment," an an-
cient principle forbidding a past legislature from binding a cur-
rent one to accept a rule or practice it otherwise would reject, 
I. See generally Neil A. Lewis, Bitter Senators Divided Anew on Judgeships, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2003, at A1 (describing, inter alia, the criticisms and defense of the fili-
busters against six of President Bush's judicial nominations). 
2. Helen Dewar & Mike Allen, Frist Seeks to End Nominees Impasse, WASH. 
POST, May 9, 2003, at A12. By the summer of 2005, Democrats had employed filibusters 
to block as many as 10 of President Bush's nominees to the federal courts of appeals. 
3. See, e.g., Liz Holloran, Dodd Resists Changes to Rules, HARTFORD COURANT, 
July 8, 2003, at A1 (describing, inter alia, Republican critiques of the filibuster and re-
sponses from Senators Dodd, Daschle, and Byrd). 
4. Only a few legal scholars have analyzed the constitutionality of the filibuster at 
length. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legisla-
tive Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 496-500 (1995); Cath-
erine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997). For 
thoughtful, but less thorough, examinations of the constitutional of the filibuster, see 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 2-3 n.l, 124 (3d ed. 2000); 
Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 87-89 
(1996). Besides these works, legal scholars have generally ignored the filibuster. Indeed, 
not a single constitutional law casebook mentions the filibuster, while only a few legisla-
tion casebooks acknowledge the filibuster with none mentioning any of the arguments 
for and against its constitutionality. 
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because it allows a filibuster of a motion to amend Rule XXII 
(or any other Senate rule) that may be ended only by superma-
jority vote. 
Finally, this Essay sketches some solutions for redressing 
problems with constitutional argumentation in, and theorizing 
about, the Senate. It calls attention to the need to measure and 
ensure the quality of discourse within the Senate on the filibuster 
and other constitutional matters. This Essay also develops a the-
ory of nonjudicial precedent, that will clarify how much defer-
ence senators and perhaps other institutions (including courts) 
ought to give to the Senate's historical practices.5 
Part I reviews the relatively straightforward textual, struc-
tural, and historical arguments supporting the constitutionality 
of the filibuster. The filibuster derives its principal authority 
from the Senate's express power to design its own procedural 
rules to govern its internal affairs and the Senate's consistent 
support for its constitutionality. It is also one of many counter-
majoritarian features of the Senate, such as the committee sys-
tem and unanimous consent requirements for agenda-setting. 
The same constitutional arguments support each of these prac-
tices. If these practices are constitutional, so is the filibuster. 
Part II addresses the strongest arguments against the consti-
tutionality of the filibuster. First, the filibuster is arguably ille-
gitimate, because it is not included among the supermajority vot-
ing requirements explicitly set forth in the Constitution. The 
second claim is that the filibuster allows a minority within the 
Senate to impede a president's nominating authority. The argu-
ment is that filibusters affect nominations and legislation differ-
ently. A nomination has no constituent parts, while a bill does. 
5. My proposed theory of nonjudicial precedent is designed in part as a response 
to criticisms of reliance on longevity only as a basis for determining constitutionality. See, 
e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 390 (2002) 
("That may be enough that the practice is historically acceptable, but it does not establish 
that the practice is constitutional." (footnote omitted)); cf Judith Resnik, History, Juris-
diction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited 
Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 171 (1995) (discussing, inter alia, the difficulties with re-
lying on historical practices in resolving questions in federal jurisdiction). 
6. The first recorded occasion on which legal scholars challenged the constitution-
ality of a committee's rendering final judgments on legislative matters occurred in the 
special hearing of the Constitution Subcommittee of the United States Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary devoted to the analysis of the constitutional of the filibuster. See Ju-
dicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Majority Is Denied Its Right 
to Consent: Hearing Before the Senate Commillee on the Judiciary Subcommillee on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (2003) (comments of 
Steven Calabresi, John Eastman, and Bruce Fein). 
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Thus, a filibuster can effectively nullify a nomination in its en-
tirety, whereas filibustering legislation might affect only a por-
tion of it. The third argument is that the filibuster can preclude 
the Senate from fulfilling its institutional obligations, including 
providing "Advice and Consent" on presidential nominations. 
The filibuster arguably impedes the entitlement of a majority of 
the Senate to render final votes on any matter it likes. The final 
argument against the filibuster is that Rule XXII, which requires 
at least two-thirds of the Senate to agree to end a filibuster 
against a motion to amend Rule XXII, is unconstitutional be-
cause it violates the basic principle that a current legislature may 
not tie the hands of a future one. 
Each of these arguments is unpersuasive. 7 First, these argu-
ments are circular. They each assume rather than establish the 
conclusion that majority rule is a fixed, constitutional principle 
within the Senate. Second, they cannot be reconciled with the 
constitutional structure as it was designed or has evolved. Third, 
Article I contains no explicit or implicit antientrenchment prin-
ciple that would preclude the Senate from adopting procedural 
rules that carry over from one session to the next and may only 
be altered with supermajority approval. 
In Part III, I address two problems with constitutional dis-
course within the Senate that became apparent in the recent fili-
buster debate. The first problem relates to the effectiveness of 
the institutional safeguards for ensuring the quality of such dis-
course. In the filibuster debate, the most effective of these 
turned out to be the Senate's rules, which condition some 
changes in the rules on supermajority approval. This require-
ment forces the side seeking change to make arguments that can 
appeal across party lines. This burden facilitates stability and or-
der within the institution. Thus, the rules turn the status quo on a 
constitutional question into the Senate's default position in the 
absence of compelling argumentation to the contrary. Without 
such stabilizing rules, the Senate would be prone to a vicious cy-
7. Remarkably few legal scholars agree that both the filibuster and its entrench-
ment are constitutional. The only other scholars who would appear to agree with this 
conclusion-as far as I know-are Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule. See Eric A. Posner 
& Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 
(2002). In contrast, Professors McGinnis, Rappaport, Chemerinsky, and Fisk believe that 
the filibuster is constitutional but that its entrenchment is unconstitutional. See also John 
C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to 
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773,1777 (2003) (defending the basic 
principle that "[o]ne legislative majority should never be able to bind future legislative 
majorities by means of ordinary legislation."). 
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de of payback in which a majority might adopt whatever rules 
maximized its power. 
The second set of problems involves the failure of constitu-
tional theorists and even senators to clarify the weight, if any, 
that the Senate ought to give nonjudicial precedent as a possible 
source of constitutional meaning. In fact, the Senate has formally 
approved the constitutionality of Rule XXII each time it has be-
come befc•re the Senate. Critics of the filibuster dismiss these 
precedents as irrelevant; on their view, the filibuster is not unlike 
segregation, for it is unconstitutional in spite of its longevity. By 
contrast, I suggest a narrow but significant role for historical 
practices as nonjudicial precedents. They help to channel (just as 
judicial precedents function within constitutional adjudication) 
and as to facilitate the same institutional ends as do judicial 
precedents, including consistency, stability, predictability, and 
reliance. While these functions do insulate a filibuster from chal-
lenge on constitutional or policy grounds, they place a burden on 
its challengers to make a compelling case for change. Those seek-
ing reform need to show, in effect, that if the position of the par-
ties within the legislative body were reversed, it would still be in 
the best interests of the institution to adopt change. No such case 
has yet been made. 
The Essay concludes that the filibuster is best understood as 
a classic example of a nonreviewable, legislative constitutional 
judgment.8 It has the same claim to constitutionality as many 
other countermajoritarian practices within the Senate, including 
the committee structure and unanimous consent requirements. 
The Constitution permits all of these practices, though it does 
not mandate any of them. These practices define the Senate's 
uniqueness as a political institution, particularly its historic 
commitments to various objectives-respecting the equality of 
its membership and to minority viewpoints; encouraging com-
promise on especially divisive matters; and facilitating stability, 
8. In my judgment, a federal court would likely dismiss a judicial challenge to the 
constitutionality of the filibuster as non-justiciable. First, the constitutional issues arising 
from the exercise of a filibuster are political questions, because the text of Article I seems 
to commit the relevant authority in this realm to the Senate, a court's overturning the 
practice would cause enormous embarrassment to the Senate, the respect due to a coor-
dinate branch of government counsels against a court's adjudicating the merits of the fili-
buster, and the Senate has an enormous need to rely on its rules as final. Second, it is 
highly. unlikely anyone, particularly within the Senate, would have standing to challenge 
the flhbuster. There IS no doubt, for instance, that senators who feel frustrated that the 
filibuster frustrates majoritarian have no standing. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 
(1997). See also Page v. Shelby, 995 F. Supp. 23 (D.C. 1998) (holding voter lacked stand-
mg to challenge the constitutionality of Rule XXII). 
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order, and collegiality in the long run. The principal checks on 
these practices, including the filibuster, are political. They in-
clude the Senate Rules, the need to maintain collegiality within 
the institution, and the political accountability of senators for 
their support of, or opposition to, specific filibusters. 
I. THE CASE FOR THE FILIBUSTER 
Senate Rule XXII, Part 2, provides in pertinent part that the 
question whether Senate debate "shall be brought to a close ... 
shall be decided in the affirmative by three-fifths of the Senators 
duly chosen and sworn-except on a measure or motion to 
amend the Senate rules, in which case the necessary affirmative 
vote shall be two-thirds of the Senators present and voting-
then said measure, motion, or other matter pending before the 
Senate, or the unfinished business, shall be the unfinished busi-
ness to the exclusion of all other business until disposed of. "9 
Neither the Constitution nor the Senate Rules expressly 
mention, let alone mandate, the filibuster. Nevertheless, the best 
starting place for understanding the authority for the filibuster is 
article I of the Constitution, which governs and defines the pow-
ers of the Congress. Of particular importance is article I, section 
5, which provides, "Each House [of the Congress] may deter-
mine the Rules of its Proceedings." 10 This section plainly author-
izes the Senate to make procedural rules, including but not lim-
ited to the length of debate. This section further authorizes the 
Senate to delegate official responsibility to smaller units (and 
even individual members) within the Senate. 11 Many of these 
delegations allow committees and their chairs to have what is 
sometimes the final say over bills and nominations. The same au-
thority supports many informal practices such as senatorial cour-
tesy-in which individual senators may make recommendations 
to the President on nominees to federal offices in their respec-
tive states12 - as well as the blue-slip process that has tradition-
ally allowed individual senators to nullify judicial nominations 
within their respective states. 13 In addition, a single senator may 
9. Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XXII, Part 2. 
10. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 5, cl. 2. 
II. Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XXVI, Part 2; see also Senate Judiciary 
Committee Rule I(1). 
12. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal 
Appointments Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687 (2001). 
13. See generally Brannon Denning, The "Blue-Slip": Enforcing the Norms of the 
Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001). 
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place a "hold" on legislation or a nomination, postponing con-
sideration until a later date. 14 The filibuster derives its constitu-
tionality from the same authority that allows each of these other 
legislative practices. Article I, section 5 empowers the Senate to 
implement procedural rules, including the specific rule governing 
cloture, Rule XXII. 15 If these practices are constitutional, so is 
the filibuster. 
The other possible authority for the filibuster is historical 
practice. The filibuster has been employed, in one form or an-
other, as extended debate in the Senate for more than two hun-
dred years. "[T]he strategic use of delay in debate is as old as the 
Senate itself. The first recorded episode of dilatory debate oc-
curred in 1790, when senators from Virginia and South Carolina 
filibustered to prevent the location of the first Congress in Phila-
delphia."16 While the First Congress allowed a so-called motion 
for the previous question which could not be debated, its name 
was misleading. In practice, "the previous question motion was 
seldom used before the Senate abolished it in 1806,"17 and it 
rarely succeeded in silencing those senators determined to con-
tinue the debate. 18 Instead, the motion tended, once made, to 
end debate by requiring the removal of the matter being debated 
from the Senate agenda. Thus, it did not force a vote but rather 
forced the Senate to move onto other business. 19 Moreover, the 
availability of this motion did not prevent the Senate from con-
tinuing to permit protracted debate to delay floor votes.20 The 
eminent biographer Robert Caro explains the history of the fili-
buster after the abolition of the previous question motion: 
For many years after 1806-for 111 years, to be precise- the 
only way a senator could be made to stop talking so that a 
14. Holds function as signals of the possibility of filibusters against measures about 
which a senator, or a group of senators, have some concern(s). They arc typically granted 
by the Majority Leader in consultation with the Minority Leader to foster collegiality and 
to put at case the senators who might have strong enough concerns about some legisla-
tive action to filibuster it (and in doing so to avoid filibusters). See generally WALTER J. 
0LESZEK, PROPOSALS TO REFORM "HOLDS" IN THE SENATE, C.R.S. REP. RL31685 
(2002); WALTER J. OLESZEK , "HOLDS" IN THE SENATE, C.R.S. REP. 98-712 GOY 
(2002). 
15. For Rule XXII, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
16. Fisk & Chemcrinsky, The FilibiiSter, supra note 4, at 187. 
17. !d. at 188. 
18. For the early history of the filibuster, sec generally Richard R. Beeman, Unlim-
ited Debate in the Senate: The First Phase, 83 POL. SCI. Q. 419, 421 (1968) and JOSEPH 
COOPER, THE PREVIOUS QUESTION: ITS STATUS AS A PRECEDENT FOR CLOTURE, S. 
Doc. No. 87-104 (2d Scss.1962). 
19. Senate Document 104, supra note 18. 
20. Fisk & Chcmcrinsky, The FilibiiSter, supra note 4, at188. 
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vote could be taken on a proposed measure was if there were 
unanimous consent that he do so, an obvious impossibility. 
And there took place therefore so many "extended discus-
sions" of measures to keep them from coming to a vote that 
the device got a name, "filibuster," from the Dutch vrijbuiter, 
which means "freebooter" or "pirate," and which passed into 
the Spanish as filibustero, because the sleek, swift ship used by 
the Caribbean pirates was called a filibote, and into legislative 
parlance because the device was, after all, a piratin¥1' or high-
jacking, of the very heart of the legislative process." 
In other words, Senate practice from 1806 until1917 allowed the 
smallest minority possible-a single senator-to bar a floor vote 
on any legislative matter by engaging in an extended speech. 
During this period, every floor vote required unanimous con-
sent. 
The Senate formally curbed the practice of endless debate 
in 1917, after eleven senators had successfully filibustered Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson's proposal to arm American merchant-
men against German submarine attacks. At President Wilson's 
urging, the Senate passed Rule XXII, which allows debate upon 
a "pending" matter to be terminated when, after a petition for 
such "cloture" was presented by sixteen senators and approved 
by two-thirds of the senators present and voting.22 In subsequent 
years, senators from both parties have used the filibuster to 
block a floor vote on a wide range of legislation.23 From 1917 un-
til2000, cloture was invoked 193 times out of the 545 times it was 
attempted.24 From 1927 through 1962, the Senate did not invoke 
cloture once?5 In this period, conservative senators repeatedly 
used the filibuster to block civil rights legislation, provoking lib-
eral senators to denounce the filibuster as illegitimate and con-
servative senators to defend it.26 In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, conservatives and liberals switched positions: Liberal 
21. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE 
SENATE 92 (2002). 
22. One study of the filibuster, authorized by the Congress to assist with the delib-
erations over President Wilson's proposal to curb the filibuster, indicated that in the pe-
riod from 1841 until just before the adoption of Rule XXII, there had been at least 22 
filibusters employed in the Senate. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SENATE FILIBUSTERS: 
EXTRACfS FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 
RELATING TO FILIBUSTERS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1917). 
23. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., 10 CONGRESS AND THE NATION 1997-
2001: A REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 967-71 ( CQ Press 2002). 
24. See id. at 971. 
25. CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACfiCE AND PROCEDURE 696 (1989). 
26. R. CARO, supra note 21, passim. 
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senators used the filibuster to block centerpieces of President 
Nixon's social and economic agenda, while many conservative 
senators questioned its constitutionality.27 After Bill Clinton be-
came President, a series of Republican filibusters blocked key 
aspects of his legislative agenda, including a comprehensive bill 
providing for national health care reform.28 Nevertheless, the 
filibuster has endured, with the most recent reform occurring in 
1985 when a Senate supermajority approved an amendment to 
Rule XXII requiring only three-fifths, rather than two-thirds, of 
the Senate as the requisite number to invoke cloture.29 
Throughout the long history of its deployment in the Sen-
ate, the filibuster has not been restricted to delaying floor votes 
on legislation. It has been often used to thwart presidential 
nominations. The first recorded instance in which it was clearly 
and unambiguously employed to defeat a judicial nomination 
occurred in 1881. At the time, Republicans held a majority of the 
seats in the Senate but were unable to end a filibuster employed 
near the end of the legislative session to preclude a floor vote on 
President Rutherford B. Hayes's nomination of Stanley Mat-
thews to the Supreme Court.30 Though Matthews eventually 
served as an Associate Justice, it was only because Hayes's Re-
publican successor, President James Garfield, renominated Mat-
thews in the next legislative session. (There were fourteen occa-
sions in the nineteenth century when the Senate held no floor 
votes on Supreme Court nominations.) 31 A recent Congressional 
Research Service study shows that from 1949 through 2002, 
senators have employed the filibuster against 35 presidential 
nominations, on 21 of which senators sought and invoked cloture 
of a filibuster against debate on a legislative matter other than a 
motion to amend a Senate rule.32 Seventeen of the 35 nomina-
27. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 23, at 967-71. 
28. /d. 
29. SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, 99TH CONG., SENATE 
CLOTURE RULE, LIMITATION OF DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RULE XXII OF THE STANDING RULES OF THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE (CLOTURE RULE) 33 (Comm. Print 1985). 
30. See J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE REJECTED 100 (1993). 
31. The nominations to the Court on which the Senate failed to act in the nine-
teenth century were President John Quincy Adams' nomination of John Crittenden in 
1829; President Andrew Jackson's nomination of Roger Taney as an Associate Justice in 
1835; President John Tyler's nominations of Reuben Walworth in 1845, Edward King in 
1845, and John M. Read in 1845; President Millard Fillmore's nominations of Edward A. 
Bradford in 1852, George Badger in 1853, and William C. Micou in 1853; and President 
Andrew Johnson's nomination of Henry Stanberry in 1866. In addition, two other nomi-
nees-George Williams and Caleb Cushing in 1874-withdrew their nominations. 
32. RICHARD S. BETH, CLOTURE ATTEMPTS ON NOMINATIONS, CRS REP. 
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tions filibustered were to Article III courts. All 21 nominations 
on which cloture was invoked were eventually confirmed. Of the 
14 nominations on which cloture was sought but not invoked, 11 
were eventually confirmed. For instance, Republican senators 
filibustered President Clinton's nominations of Walter Dellinger 
to head the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department 
and Janet Napolitano to be U.S. Attorney for Arizona, but even-
tually the Senate confirmed both nominees-Dellinger after Re-
publican senators relinquished their opposition to his nomina-
tion and Napolitano after the Senate voted 72-26 on a cloture 
motion to end the filibuster against her nomination.33 Four of the 
35 filibustered nominations failed altogether-then-Associate 
Justice Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice and Judge Homer Thorn-
berry to be an Associate Justice in 1968, Sam Brown to be Am-
bassador in 1994, and Dr. Henry Foster to be Surgeon General 
in 1995. Other nominations have failed without having been 
formally filibustered; for example, Senator Jesse Helms's threat 
of a filibuster nullified President Clinton's intention to nominate 
then-Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger as Solicitor 
General.34 Another dramatic use of the filibuster occurred when 
Republican senators filibustered five of President Clinton's 
nominations to the State Department in order to gain leverage in 
a dispute over whether the State Department adequately inves-
tigated allegations that a former Clinton campaign worker had 
improperly searched the records of 160 former political appoint-
ees and publicly disclosed the contents of two of the files.35 As 
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport concluded in their ex-
tended study of the Constitution's supermajority voting re-
quirements, "the continuous use of filibusters since the early 
Republic provides compelling support for their constitutional-
ity."36 
Neither the express authority of the Senate to devise its 
procedural rules nor the longstanding employment of the filibus-
ter within the Senate definitely settles the constitutionality of the 
filibuster. In constitutional law, there are few knockout punches, 
and each of the arguments made on behalf of the constitutional-
RS20801, at 1, 3, 5-6 (2002). 
33. 139 CONG. REC. S16351 (Nov. 19, 1993). 
34. See Judicial Nominations, supra note 6 (statement of Michael 1. Gerhardt). 
35. See John Aloysius Farrell, Fight on State Dept.Files Halts Senate, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Nov. 4, 1993, NationaUForeign section at 24. 
36. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 4, at 497. 
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ity of the filibuster are prone to counterarguments (of varying 
quality). 
II. THE CASE AGAINST THE FILIBUSTER 
The constitutionality of the filibuster has been challenged 
on four principal grounds. First, the Framers did not include it 
among the supermajority voting requirements expressly listed in 
the Constitution. Second, it violates majority rule in the Senate. 
Third, it impedes a President's nominating authority. Finally, a 
supermajority voting requirement to end debate on amending 
the cloture rule is an impermissible entrenchment that allows 
one Senate to bind the hands of a future Senate. Each challenge 
is difficult to reconcile with conventional sources of constitu-
tional meaning. 
A. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT SET FORTH ALL 
PERMISSIBLE SUPERMAJORITY VOTING 
REQUIREMENTS 
The first argument against filibusters is that they are not 
among the supermajority voting requirements specifically recog-
nized in the Constitution.37 The Constitution specifically requires 
a supermajority vote in seven situations.38 This enumeration of 
the instances in which the Constitution requires a supermajority 
suggests arguably that the Framers assumed that a simple major-
ity vote in each chamber would suffice for all other congressional 
action. One may construe these provisions as showing that the 
Framers knew how to provide for supermajority voting require-
ments when they wanted to do so, and their failure to allow for 
procedural rules requiring supermajority voting reflects their in-
37. See, e.g., Judicial Nominations, supra note 6 (statements of John Eastman, 
Douglas Kmiec, and Steven Calabresi). 
38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (providing that the "Senate shall have the sole 
Power to try all Impeachments" and that "no Person shall be convicted without the Con-
currence of two thirds of the Members present."); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (allowing either 
chamber of Congress to expel a member if at least two-thirds of the members concur); id. 
art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing that overriding a presidential veto requires at least two-thirds 
of both the House and the Senate); id. art. II,§ 2, d. 2 (requiring at least two-thirds of the 
senators to ratify treaties); id. art. V (providing that for Congress to impose a constitu-
tional amendment both the House and the Senate must prove it by a two-thirds vote); id. 
amend. XIV, § 3 (providing that those who have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the Constitution cannot be elected to Congress or hold any office, but that Con-
gress by a two-thirds vote of both houses may remove such disability); id. amend. XXV, 
§ 4 (creating a procedure whereby Congress, by a two-thirds vote of both houses, may 
determine that a President is disabled). 
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tention not to authorize any. On this view, the filibuster is trou-
bling because it substitutes a supermajority voting requirement 
for the majority vote that the Constitution putatively requires in 
floor votes on nominations and legislation. 
The major problem with this reading is that it makes no dis-
tinction between substantive and procedural requirements. It 
proceeds on the assumption that all voting requirements within 
the Constitution should fall into the same category. But all vot-
ing requirements are not the same. One may read the Constitu-
tion as requiring supermajority voting in seven specified in-
stances but leaving each chamber free to design its own rules or 
voting requirements to govern its internal affairs. None pertains 
to procedures for governing the internal affairs of the House or 
the Senate. None appears, in other words, to apply, much less re-
strict, the discretion expressly vested in each chamber by article 
I, section 5 to devise rules to govern its respective proceedings. 
Each of the instances in which the Constitution expressly re-
quires a supermajority is directed at certain substantive decisions 
that can be made only by the full chamber. The expressio unius 
argument might have worked here had the Senate been trying to 
impose a supermajority voting requirement in floor votes on 
nominations, but that is not what the Senate has done. The su-
permajority voting requirements to invoke cloture is simply a 
procedural rule, not a substantive one. 
B. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT ESTABLISH MAJORITY 
RULE IN THE SENATE AS A FIXED CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENTITLEMENT 
The second major argument against the filibuster is that it 
violates majority rule. This argument is predicated on reading 
three provisions of the Constitution as fixing majority rule as the 
requ~site_ mar3~in for final action by the Senate on legislation and nommat10ns. 
At most, these three provisions establish majority rule as a 
default rule for floor votes in the absence of any other explicitly 
constitutionally required procedures. Rule XXII leaves this de-
fault rule intact. It does not require 60 votes to adopt a law; it 
39. For the constitutional provisions on which this argument is premised, see U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (providing that the "Vice-President ... shall be President of the 
Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided"); id. art. I,§ 5, cl. 1 (pro-
viding that "a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business"); id. 
art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing that Congress can override a presidential veto by a two-thirds 
vote of each House). 
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requires at least 60 votes to end debate. Passing a bill, or con-
firming a nomination, still requires a simple majority. Moreover, 
the clause declaring that a majority of each chamber ought to 
constitute a quorum creates the basic threshold for business in 
each chamber,40 but it says nothing about the propriety of dele-
gating final authority over various matters to committees or the 
voting margin necessary to end debates, pass legislation, or con-
firm nominees. 
Transforming the default rule into a fixed principle requires 
a leap of faith. No language within the Constitution expressly 
mandates majority rule in the Senate. Nor is there any evidence 
that the Framers intended to guarantee that majority rule would 
be the unalterable, required margin for voting on every substan-
tive and procedural vote within the Senate. The operating prem-
ise of many critics of the filibuster is that majority rule ought to 
control every matter within the Senate. They insist that defend-
ers of the filibuster prove that majority rule is not a fixed consti-
tutional principle. In the absence of such "proof," they insist, 
majority rule prevails. Yet, majority rule can be established as a 
constitutional principle only by a showing that it is grounded in 
legitimate sources of constitutional meaning. The absence of a 
convincing argument to the contrary does not suffice. 
Supreme Court precedent supports treating majority rule as 
a default rule rather than an inflexible principle. Chief Justice 
Warren Burger remarked on behalf of a unanimous Court: "Cer-
tainly any departure from strict majority rule gives dispropor-
tionate power to the minority. But there is nothing in the lan-
guage of the Constitution, our history, or our cases that requires 
that a majority always prevail on every issue."41 
An additional argument against Rule XXII derives from 
United States v. Ballin.42 Ballin suggests that Article I, section 5, 
does not grant unlimited authority in "each house to determine 
its rules of proceedings. "43 Rather neither house may "by its 
rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental 
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the 
mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the 
result which is sought to be attained. "44 This language acknowl-
40. !d. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (providing in pertinent part that "a Majority of each [House 
of Congress] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business"). 
41. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). 
42. 144 U.S. 1 (1892). 
43. !d. at 5. 
44. !d. 
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edges limits to the discretion of the Senate in devising internal 
rules. The critical question is, however, what those limits are. 
The Supreme Court's statement in Ballin suggests, uncontrover-
sially, that the Senate could not adopt a rule barring members of 
one party from serving on Committees, because it might violate 
the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment and the Fifth 
Amendment's due process guarantee and equal protection com-
ponent. In contrast, the filibuster is a neutral rule. It may be de-
ployed by any senator, regardless of party affiliation. Ballin does 
not, however, undercut supermajority voting requirements to in-
voke cloture or to amend Rule XXII. The Court merely seems to 
subject Senate rules to a rational basis test. In the Court's words, 
there must be a "reasonable relation[ship]" between a rule and 
its objective. The objective of the supermajority voting require-
ments regarding motions to amend Rule XXII arguably is to fa-
cilitate stability within the Senate, while filibusters encourage 
compromise on contentious questions. 
Critics of the filibuster also rely on the appointments 
clause45 to argue that majority rule applies with special force to 
judicial nominations.46 They construe this Clause as obliging the 
full Senate, rather than a minority of its members, to give its 
"Advice and Consent" to judicial nominations. They suggest 
floor votes on every judicial nomination are required to ensure 
due regard for a president's special prerogative to nominate Ar-
ticle III judges, especially Supreme Court justices. For the Sen-
ate to fulfill its institutional obligations, a majority of its mem-
bers must be able to act on its behalf, but the filibuster makes 
this practically impossible by enabling a minority to impede the 
majority's will. 
There are, however, at least three serious problems with this 
argument. First, it is predicated on a seriously flawed reading of 
the Appointments Clause. The Appointments Clause sets forth 
the necessary conditions for someone to be appointed as an Ar-
ticle III judge. One of these conditions is nomination by the 
President; while another is confirmation by the Senate. Confir-
mation is achieved by a majority vote of the Senate. The Clause 
sets forth the prerequisites for a lawful judicial appointment. It 
45. U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2, cl. 2 (providing in pertinent part that the President 
"shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all 
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-
vided for, and which shall be established by Law"). 
46. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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says nothing about the specific procedures applicable in confir-
mation proceedings or about how someone may be denied con-
firmation. 
Second, there is only one Appointments Clause. The clause 
provides a uniform process for all confirmable officials. It recog-
nizes no distinction among officers whom the President appoints, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Nor does the clause 
prioritize presidential nominations. It does not indicate which 
nominations, if any, should be treated differently for purposes of 
the Senate's power to give its "Advice and Consent." "Ambas-
sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Su-
preme Court, and all other officers of the United States" are 
subject to the same procedures. While the Senate retains the dis-
cretion to adopt different procedures for different offices, noth-
ing in the Constitution compels it to do so. In short, there is no 
textual basis-or any other credible authority-for singling out 
any particular kind of nomination for constitutional protection. 
Moreover, the Appointments Clause does not impose any 
time limit by which the full Senate must provide its "Advice and 
Consent." The Constitution does not prohibit senators from tak-
ing their time in deliberating over legislation or nominations. 
Just as the Constitution does not dictate how fast presidents 
must act in making nominations, it does not direct how quickly 
the Senate must act in approving or disapproving presidential 
nominations. Perhaps senators need days, maybe months, or 
even years to make final decisions.47 Delays in reaching final 
judgments might be attributable to many reasons, including an 
administration's decision not to release documents requested by 
a committee, difficulty in scheduling witnesses, or simply pro-
tracted negotiations among committee members. The absence of 
a time limit on Senate proceedings is all the more telling because 
article I, section 7, prescribes a time limit for the President to 
sign or veto a bill. Hence, it is clear that the Framers knew how 
to set time limits, but failed to do so in this context. None of 
these delays offends any constitutional requirement. 
47. In recognition that it might not take final action on a nomination, the Senate 
has adopted Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XXXI, Part 6. It provides, "Nominations 
neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which they are made shall not be 
acted upon at any succeeding session without being made again to the Senate by the 
President." This rule, too, is inconsistent with majority rule in the Senate, because it 
treats a nomination, under the circumstances described, as effectively defeated even 
though no maJonty has formally acted upon it. 
460 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:445 
Third, the argument that filibusters allow a minority to pre-
clude the Senate from fulfilling its institutional obligations mis-
takenly equates the institution with a majority within it. Yet 
again, critics of the filibuster have assumed their conclusion. In 
no place does the Constitution equate a majority of the Senate 
with the institution itself. Nor, for that matter, is it clear what 
constitutes the majority that supposedly ought to be treated as 
the functional equivalent of the institution. This cannot be de-
termined simply by identifying the party affiliations of the sena-
tors, because a single party may not control, or barely occupies, a 
majority within the Senate 
Moreover, the Constitution does not define the institution 
of the Senate as merely a majority within it. It defines the institu-
tion as consisting of two senators from every state (not most 
states or as some number greater than half of the total of two 
times the number of states) and charged with the special pur-
pose, as the Framers repeatedly insisted, of offsetting majori-
tarian impulses.48 This purpose explains the special design of the 
Senate, with each state having two senators, each senator having 
a six-year term,49 and equal suffrage among the states.50 
Fourth, elevating majority rule in the Senate to a constitu-
tional entitlement would wreak havoc. It would render unconsti-
tutional any action by a committee or individual senator that had 
the effect of nullifying a judicial nomination. Mandatory major-
ity rule in the Senate would preclude committees' traditional 
powers as gatekeepers for nominations or any other legislative 
business. This principle would also overturn the longstanding 
practice of conditioning floor action in the Senate on a unani-
mous consent agreement between the majority and minority 
leaders. This practice would presumably be unconstitutional be-
cause it allows a single senator to object to some matter being 
brought to the floor of the Senate and thereby prevent a major-
ity (even a supermajority) from voting. This reading of the Ap-
pointments Clause would also render unconstitutional any tem-
porary holds, which are used routinely to delay final 
consideration of legislation and nominations. Temporary holds 
near the end of a legislative session can often be fatal-delay a 
nomination just long enough near the end of a session and the 
nomination lapses. Such actions would be intolerable because 
48. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 17-38 (revised edition 2003). 
49. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 3, cl. 1. 
50. See id. art. Y. 
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they purportedly interfere with a majority's entitlement never to 
be stopped, for procedural reasons, from acting on every presi-
dential nomination. 
Reading the Appointments Clause as entitling a majority of 
the Senate to render final votes on presidential nominations 
would mean that there would be constitutional violations every 
time a nomination fails to reach a final vote. It is hard, at best, to 
maintain that this entitlement applies only to judicial nomina-
tions. One might argue that the independence of the judiciary 
depends on the Senate's acting upon every judicial nomination. 
There is, however, only one appointments clause, whose text es-
tablishes no hierarchy among nominations, much less provides 
any support for different procedures within the Senate regarding 
different nominations. The constitutional violation presumably 
arises when a majority is willing but unable for some reason to 
confirm a nominee, but it is unclear what procedures the Consti-
tution requires to determine a majority's willingness to vote 
prior to the final vote. It would be absurd to think that the ap-
pointments clause requires two votes in the Senate-once by a 
majority to signal its willingness to confirm and another time for 
a majority actually to confirm the nominee in question. Even a 
vote to invoke cloture does not necessarily reflect how senators 
will vote on a disputed nomination. 
Reading the Appointments Clause as empowering a willing 
majority to vote on a presidential nomination leaves unclear the 
constitutionality of senators' changing their minds after they sig-
nal their initial willingness to confirm. Initial signals about a 
nomination make the floor vote possible, even though a change 
of mind in a close vote could spell the difference between rejec-
tion and confirmation. Nor is it clear how majority rule can be 
implemented if some senators whose votes are needed for a ma-
jority have not formed their preferences before the final vote on 
a contested nominee. Enforcing this principle is also practically 
impossible because once a nomination has expired, the President 
may nominate someone else to a vacancy. Once the President 
has made a new nomination, there is no remedy for making 
whole a nominee who has been denied a final vote by a favora-
bly disposed majority. 
For instance, consider what would have happened to Roger 
Gregory, whom President Clinton nominated to the Fourth Cir-
cuit in the final year of his administration. By the end of the ses-
sion, the Senate had not acted on the nomination, so it expired. 
Although he was under no constitutional obligation to re-
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nominate Gregory, President Bush did so. Had he not, the Sen-
ate would not have had a second chance to act upon Gregory's 
nomination and Gregory would not be a federal judge today. 
If a Senate majority has the right to vote whenever it is so 
disposed, it must have a corresponding right not to vote. A le-
gitimate failure to vote must be the consequence of majoritarian 
preferences. If a failure to vote does not reflect a majority's ac-
tual preferences, then it violates majority rule. To reconcile fail-
ures to vote with arguments made on behalf of majority rule, one 
might suggest, as some critics of the filibuster recently did, that 
the Senate's committee structure is permissible but the filibuster 
is not, because majoritarian acquiescence in committee rulings 
legitimizes them.51 The problem is how one determines whether 
a majority has acquiesced in committee rulings. No majority 
takes a formal vote to approve a committee's negative recom-
mendations, so proof of acquiescence is absent. A failure to act 
is explicable on all sorts of grounds. A failure to act could be eas-
ily construed as evidence that the majority's will is not relevant 
to committee decisions. The reason committee actions or nonac-
tions are legitimate is not that a majority supports them but that 
committees are duly authorized pursuant to the Senate's rules. 
C. FILIBUSTERING JUDICIAL NOM INA TIONS DOES 
NOT VIOLATE A PRESIDENT'S NOMINATING 
AUTHORITY 
The third argument against the filibuster is an extension of 
the second. It posits that by allowing a minority within the Sen-
ate to keep the Senate from voting on a president's nominees, 
filibusters frustrate a President's efforts to fill certain offices. 
The claim, in effect, is that filibustering nominations nullifies a 
President's constitutional obligation to nominate judges and 
other high-ranking officers. This claim is, however, misguided. 
First, filibusters do not deprive Presidents of their nominat-
ing authority. Presidents retain the complete discretion to nomi-
nate whomever they please. Once a President has made his 
nomination, the exercise of his authority is presumably at an 
end. The nomination then becomes the Senate's business. The 
fact that a President were to have such discretion imposes no 
special obligation on the Senate to approve his nominations or to 
move on them on his terms than its own. The Senate retains the 
51. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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discretion to give its "Advice and Consent" as it sees fit, includ-
ing its preferred pace and procedures for allowing nominations 
to reach the floor. 
Second, there are various mechanisms by which senators 
seek to counsel Presidents on potential nominees. A much more 
common practice than the filibuster is senatorial courtesy, in 
which a president defers to the recommendations of senators 
from his party on nominees to federal offices within their respec-
tive states.52 Senatorial courtesy requires a President to defer to 
only one or two senators. A President is free to reject the rec-
ommendations of such senators, though, much more often than 
not, his failure to heed their counsel has resulted in either the 
formal rejections of his nominations or the failure of a commit-
tee or the full Senate to take further action on a substitute nomi-
nation. These failures are not constitutionally troubling; they do 
not interfere with either a President's nominating authority 
(which he has exercised as he has seen fit) or the full Senate's 
duty to provide its "Advice and Consent" on presidential nomi-
nations (which it has discharged pursuant to its institutional pro-
cedures). 
Third, the nominating process is the same as the exercises of 
presidential authority in other contexts that do not impose obli-
gations on other branches. Presidents may propose legislation, 
but Congress has no institutional obligation to have floor votes 
on every legislative proposal. Presidents may negotiate treaties, 
but the Senate is under no obligation to bring treaties to ratifica-
tion votes on the floor. The fact that a treaty negotiated by a 
president fails to reach the floor, for whatever reason, does not 
violate the President's negotiating authority. The same may be 
said about a filibuster against a President's judicial nominations. 
The President's authority to nominate certain officials and 
his authority to negotiate treaties differ in at least one significant 
respect. A president is under no constitutional obligation to ne-
gotiate a treaty, whereas he may be under a constitutional obli-
gation to make a nomination. He may have the latter obligation 
because the offices to which he makes nominations exist by vir-
tue of laws enacted by Congress. The President's obligation to 
enforce the laws faithfully may include staffing the offices cre-
ated by Congress. The fact that a president has a special duty 
with respect to nominations that does not correspond to treaties 
52. See generally GERHARDT, supra note 48, at 143-53 (describing the evolution of 
senatorial courtesy). 
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makes, however, no difference with respect to the Senate's insti-
tutional obligation in either case. Senators do not have a corre-
sponding duty to the "take care" clause. The fact that Congress 
has created an office to which the President has made a nomina-
tion will of course be known to the Senate, but it does not alter 
the Senate's basic discretion to provide its "Advice and Con-
sent," either generally or with respect to particular nominations. 
D. ARTICLE I CONTAINS No IMPLICIT 
ANTI-ENTRENCHMENT PRINCIPLE. 
The final argument against the constitutionality of the fili-
buster is that Senate Rules impermissibly allow the entrench-
ment of the filibuster. Rule XXII requires at least 60 votes to in-
voke cloture and at least two-thirds of the Senate to end a 
filibuster of a motion to amend Rule XXII, while Rule V pro-
vides that "[t]he rules of the Senate shall continue from one 
Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as pro-
vided in these rules. "53 These rules allegedly allow a current 
Senate to deprive a future majority within the Senate to choose 
the rules-including those governing the filibuster-under which 
it prefers to operate. 
While this argument is the strongest of those arrayed 
against the filibuster, it is flawed for several reasons. Perhaps 
most importantly, the Senate is a "continuing body."54 For good 
reason, the Senate has always viewed itself as a continuing body 
and has never reconstructed itself, like the House of Representa-
tives, from scratch at the outset of every session. On three sepa-
rate occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized the Senate as 
a distinctive political body in the constitutional scheme because 
it is "continuous."55 As Cynthia Farina has explained, the Senate 
is unique within our constitutional structure: " [ s ]taggered elec-
tion increases institutional stability by rendering the Senate an 
effectively continuous body in contrast to the House, which must 
53. Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule V, Part 2. 
54. 134 CONG. REC. S1807 (Mar. 3, 1988) (statement of Sen. Byrd); see also 132 
CONG. REC. S9221 (July 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Byrd: "Mr. President, the United 
States Senate is an unbroken thread, running from our time back to its first meeting in 
New York in April 1789. By this I mean the Senate is a continuous body. While the en-
tire House of Representatives is elected every two years, only one-third of the senators 
run at each biennial election. Since two-thirds carry over, our rules are continuous and do 
not have to be readopted at the beginning of each Congress."). 
55. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 512 (1975); Sin-
clair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 181 
(1927). 
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fully reconstitute itself every two years. "56 Vikram Amar agrees: 
"while the [Supreme] Court historically may appear to be the 
most continuous body, the Senate is the only institution that 
cannot-short of amendment-'turn over' at one time. The 
President does, the House conceivably could, and the Court ef-
fectively could as well, if the political branches 'packed it' .... "57 
The unique structure of the Senate relieves it of any obligation, 
or ability, to reconstitute itself with each new congressional ses-
sion. The Senate's design is simply not analogous to that of the 
House. Rule V formalizes the Senate's longstanding recognition 
of itself as a continuing body whose rules are already in effect at 
the outset of each session. 58 
Because the Senate is a continuing body, it is unclear which 
members of the Senate are injured by the entrenchment of the 
filibuster. At the outset of each new session, the Senate is not 
comparable to other legislative bodies, including the House, all 
of whose members have either been elected or re-elected to new 
terms. Staggered election of senators precludes the possibility of 
there ever being a new majority being sworn into office at the 
outset of a new congressional session. At the outset of each new 
session, two-thirds of the Senate are continuing their terms; only 
a third of the Senate is eligible to begin new terms. It makes no 
sense to empower only a third of the Senate to express their 
opinions on the rules: the new members do not constitute a ma-
jority of the body and thus do not constitute a "quorum" as de-
fined by the Constitution. (The new members are able to vote 
upon the rules, though with their votes weighted differently than 
if a mere majority were sufficient for reform.) Within the Senate, 
there can be a "new" majority only if one count some combina-
tion of members continuing their terms with those being sworn 
into new terms. Yet, the antientrenchment principle is defended 
on the need to vindicate the "rights" of new members not those 
continuing their terms. The antientrenchment principle pre-
sumes that the special circumstances of new members imbues 
them with a special need to vote anew on the rules, but it makes 
no sense for those carrying over their terms to take advantage of 
56. Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a 
Complex World, 72 CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 987, 1016 n.l22 (1997) (citing THE FEDERALIST 
No. 63 (James Madison)). 
57. Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election, A Strucwral Examina-
tion of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1400 (1996); see also Vikram 
David Amar, Note: The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111, 1126 (1988). 
58. Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule V, Part 2. 
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this entitlement when they do not share the "special circum-
stances" giving rise to it. 
Moreover, majority rule as a fixed principle has been flatly 
and invariably rejected by the Senate. Besides questioning the 
general relevance of historical practices (a matter I address in 
the next section), one might question the rules requiring super-
majority votes to invoke cloture or to amend a Senate rule if 
they were adopted by a mere majority. If this were true, it would 
dubiously enable a majority to entrench its power by forcing su-
permajorities to undo its decisions. The Senate's rules regarding 
filibusters have, however, been followed in every instance in 
which they have either been adopted or modified. There is not a 
single instance in which the Senate has amended its rules without 
following its rules.59 Thus, critics of the filibuster must question 
entrenchment per se. 
Such binding is not confined to Rules XXII and V. One 
congressionally authorized study indicates that the Senate in 
1995 had eight rules requiring supermajority voting.60 Moreover, 
near the end of President Clinton's impeachment trial, a motion 
was made to alter the Senate's rules requiring closed delibera-
tions on the President's guilt. The Senate recognized that its 
rules could be changed only by supermajority vote and failed to 
muster the requisite number for an amendment, even though 
this allowed a rule adopted by a much earlier Senate to remain 
in effect.61 If a past Senate may not bind the hands of a future 
one, then the Senate acted illegally when it rejected the motion 
to open its final deliberations on Clinton's guilt. No one would 
accuse the Chief Justice of the United States William Rehnquist 
as Presiding Officer and the Parliamentarian of failing to recog-
nize, much less to prevent, this supposed breach of the Constitu-
tion. 
Third, there is no constitutional directive against the en-
trenchment of procedural rules within the Senate. A leading ar-
ticle by Eric Posner and Adrian V ermeule comprehensively dis-
sects the argument for implying an antientrenchment principle 
into article I. As they argue, "Article I's elaborate crafting of the 
59. See 4 HIND'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 4396, 
4404,4405,4544,4545 (Asher C. Hinds ed., 1907). 
60. RichardS. Beth, Cong. Res. Serv., Cong. Res. Serv. Mem., Supermajority Vote 
Requirements Currently in Effect in Congress, at 3-4 (1995). 
61. 145 CONG. REC. 1069, 1071-72 (Jan. 28, 1999) (Rollcall Vote No. 6: Daschle 
Amend. 1 to S.Res. 30,44-54 and Rollcall Vote No.7: Daschle Amend. 2 to S.Res. 30,43-
55). 
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metes and bounds of legislative authority counsels against find-
ing [an] additional, implicit restriction[ against entrenchment] on 
statutes that (by assumption) fall within one of the enumerated 
grants of power."62 They suggest further that entrenchment does 
not restrict the discretion vested in each chamber by the rules of 
proceeding clause, whose "reference to 'each House' is not a 
temporal limitation, but just a corollary of bicameralism. "63 The 
Constitution "establishes that each house separately, rather than 
the Congress as a whole, may make rules for its respective inter-
nal affairs. "64 Professors Posner and Vermeule add that "rooting 
the rule against entrenchment in the equal authority of succes-
sive legislatures is hard to square with Congress' undisputed au-
thority to enact laws containing sunset clauses-clauses that 
cause a statute to lapse, by operation of law, after a defined pe-
riod. "65 Even statutes without sunset clauses entrench policies 
because they remain in effect indefinitely until a subsequent 
Congress chooses to displace them and thus require a subse-
quent Congress to expend resources. Yet, no one questions the 
constitutionality of such enactments on entrenchment grounds. 
Similarly, Professors Posner and Vermeule directly expose 
the fallacy of attacking Senate Rule XXII as putatively imper-
missible entrenchment. 
[T)he anti-entrenchment objection to the cloture rule is really 
a wholesale objection to constitutionalism as such. In a bind-
ing constitutional order, neither the future legislative majority 
nor the underlying electorate has any general "right ... to 
rule according to its will." True, the constitutional restrictions 
come into force by a different procedure than do legislatively 
entrenched rules, but that is a different, narrower objection; 
and ... it is also a question-begging objection, because it un-
justifiably assumes that restrictions on any given legislature 
may derive only from the procedure for constitutional en-
trenchment, rather than from the procedure for enacting en-
trenching statutes or rules. . . . The position is inconsistent, 
not merely with legislative entrenchment, but with the accep-
tance of binding constitutions generally. 66 
. !he arguments against inferring a principle of majority rule 
w1thm the Senate from the text of the Constitution apply as well 
62. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 1675. 
63. !d. at 1683 
64. !d. (citation omitted). 
65. !d. at 1676. 
66. /d. at 1695. 
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to attempts to infer a principle of simple majoritariansim from 
the structure or the tradition of the Constitution. The latter prin-
ciple is inconsistent with American constitutional practices. Pro-
fessors Posner and Vermeule explain the problem with relying 
on simple majoritarianism as an argument against entrenchment: 
... If there are political or logistical costs to repealing legisla-
tion- and there surely are- then an earlier Congress "binds" 
a later Congress by enacting legislation that cannot be 
costlessly repealed or changed, except in those instances in 
which it provides for the legislation to expire on its own ... 
[O]ne Congress would hardly do a favor to a later Congress 
by making all legislation expire at the end of a [session], for 
this would impose on the subsequent Congress the burden of 
renegotiating and reenacting the expired legislation. Short of 
anticipating the needs and desires of future Congresses-
which is impossible-a Congress will inevitably burden future 
Congresses, for the simple reason that the earlier Congress 
comes first and cannot avoid actions that will turn out to hin-
der the later Congress. 67 
It will not respond that displacing a prior statute is easier 
than changing rules because of different voting procedures. Ei-
ther antientrenchment is a constitutional principle or it is not. If 
it were a principle, then it would require forgoing or striking 
down any statute or rule that impedes a legislative majority from 
implementing its preferences. Yet such a principle cannot be 
squared with legislative reality. A new Congress cannot muster 
the will or the resources to enact an entirely new set of laws or 
rules. It will invariably leave intact some policy or rule not pre-
ferred by a current majority and thus allow entrenchment. In any 
event, Rule V implements the sound practice that the preexisting 
Rules of the Senate remain in effect and can be changed only in 
accordance with the Rules themselves. Otherwise, each new 
Senate would lack procedural rules at the outset of a session, 
which would be a recipe for chaos. Rule V thus helps to provide 
for institutional stability within the Senate. 
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have given the most 
comprehensive critique of Professors Posner's and Vermeule's 
arguments against inferring an antientrenchment principle into 
Article 1.68 Professors McGinnis and Rappaport suggest, first, 
that the popular understanding that a current legislature may not 
67. /d. at 1686-87. 
68. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Con-
stitwiona/ and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003). 
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bind the hands of a future one was so widespread that the Fram-
ers reasonably felt no need to include it among Article I's ex-
press prohibitions.69 Second, they find "clear statements" sup-
porting an antientrenchment principle "in a famous statute 
passed by the Virginia legislature one year before the framing of 
the Constitution and in a statement by the father of the Consti-
tution, James Madison, made in Congress one year after the 
Constitution took effect."70 Moreover, the traditional view 
against legislative entrenchment was itself so well entrenched 
that "had anyone believed that the Constitution would depart 
from the traditional view, significant public debate about it 
would have been likely to have arisen, especially among the 
Anti-Federalists."71 According to Professors McGinnis and Rap-
paport, "if silence from the debates in the area suggests any-
thing, it suggests that the traditional view was accepted." 72 
There are several problems with this analysis. The first is its 
reliance on constitutional silence as acquiescence. Constitutional 
silence could mean many things, not least the Framers and the 
Anti-Federalists' simple failure to address the issue. Silence in 
the text and silence in the debates add up to nothing. If silence 
has any meaning, it is a meaning imposed by those purporting to 
construe it. It will not suffice to is a supposition, not a fact, to 
suggest that entrenchment was a problem the Framers consid-
ered; there is no proof they gave the matter any thought. They 
had larger, or at least what they considered larger, problems with 
which to deal. The purpose of constitutional interpretation is to 
determine the meaning of the Constitution; it is not to perfect 
the document or to fill gaps that were arguably inadvertently left 
in the text. 
Second, the fact that the Virginia Statute for Religious 
Freedom expressly included an antientrenchment principle cuts 
against construing the federal Constitution as implicitly includ-
ing an antientrenchment principle. The former statute shows 
that a legislature disposed to adopt such a principle knew how to 
make its preference explicit. If the Framers had intended to in-
clude such a principle in the Constitution, they could have fol-
lowed the Virginia example. Their failure to follow Virginia's 
example is telling. 
69. /d. at 399-400. 
70. /d. at 402. 
71. /d. at 403. 
72. /d. 
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Moreover, James Madison's recognition of this principle in 
the House of Representatives hardly establishes it as a prohibi-
tion applicable to the Senate. Madison's comments made sense 
for the House, which reconstitutes itself every two years, but 
they are inapplicable to the Senate because of its unique struc-
ture. 
Third, the text of the Constitution overcomes any argument 
based on the silence of the Framers. The written text purports to 
provide positive law where there was none before; its effective-
ness and meaningfulness depend on its enforcement.73 No sensi-
ble rule of constitutional construction would place the written 
text below the silence of the Framers. 
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport fail to address a final 
problem. Even though the House must re-constitute itself at the 
outset of each new session, it follows a preset agenda. When the 
members show up to reconstitute themselves, they already have 
an agenda to follow. This is, however, not an agenda made by 
the newly constituted House. To the contrary, it is an agenda in-
herited by the newly constituted House from its predecessors. 
Between sessions of the House, someone must speak for the 
House in notifying the newly elected members when and where 
they must meet to reconstitute, the order of items on which they 
must vote, the voting margin required for each of their votes, the 
rules they may adopt or revise, the committees to which mem-
bers will be assigned, and the jurisdictions of those committees. 
This agenda illustrates the extent to which entrenchment is a fact 
of life in Congress. 
III. THE FUTURE OF THE FILIBUSTER 
No one knows for sure what reform, if any, is in store for 
the filibuster. If past is prologue, we can expect questions about 
the constitutionality of the filibuster to persist and for the Sen-
ate, at some point, to amend Rule XXII. In anticipation of fur-
73. See Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938) ("To disregard such a de-
liberate choice of words and their natural meaning would be a departure from the first 
principle of constitutional interpretation."); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 570-71 
(1840) ("In expounding the Constitution of the United States every word must have its 
due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no 
word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added."); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 
(1798) (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("If ... the Legislature of the Union ... shall pass a law, 
within the general scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to 
be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural jus-
tice."). 
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ther debate and the possible reform of Rule XXII, it might be 
useful to consider what the recent debate about the filibuster 
teaches us about constitutional discourse within the Senate. The 
first is the need for institutional safeguards to ensure the quality 
of constitutional debate within the Senate. The second is the 
need to develop a coherent notion of nonjudicial precedent. I 
suggest answers to those needs below. 
A. ENSURING THE QUALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE. 
The Constitution provides several institutional safeguards 
for ensuring the quality of constitutional debate in the Senate. 
The reduced political accountability of senators, their unusually 
long terms, and the Senate's function as a countermajoritarian 
institution have been designed to prod senators to take the long, 
rather than the expedient, view in deciding constitutional ~ues­
tions.74 Add around-the-clock media coverage to the mix,7 and 
it would appear as if there were many incentives for senators to 
rise above partisanship in deliberating the constitutionality of 
Rule XXII. 
Measuring the quality of legislative debate is not easy,76 but 
by at least two admittedly imperfect standards the Senate debate 
on Rule XXII was mixed at best. One possible standard would 
be measuring the extent of debate, including the institutional re-
sources devoted to debate. The Senate debate on the filibuster 
consisted of four hearings scheduled over the course of less than 
two months. 77 At three of the four hearings, no more than four 
74. Every source points to the Senate as a uniquely designed political institution 
whose composition, members, organization, and powers are all supposed to enable it to 
resist popular pressure and to deliberate in the long-term interests of the republic. See 
generally GERHARDT, supra note 48, at 63-69 (discussing the implications of the original 
design of the Senate as a counter-majoritarian institution). For instance, the least popu-
lous states are represented on a par with the most populous states in the Senate, and over 
50% of the Senate is elected by no more than 16% of the nation. Such design was in-
tended to ensure that senators would be less prone than their House counterparts to im-
plement simple, majoritarian preferences. 
75. See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 19 (1997). 
76. For one of the few exceptions to the general absence of legal scholars' devel-
opment of criteria to measure the quality of constitutional discourse within the Senate, 
see Louis Fisher, Constitutional interpretation by Members of Congress , 63 N.C. L. REV. 
707 (1985) and Abner Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitu-
tion?, 61 N.C. L. REv. 587 (1983). Fisher and Mikva disagree over, inter alia, the extent to 
which members of Congress have the time, expertise, and interest to master constitu-
tional analysis and to which either chamber devotes special resources to support mem-
bers in undertaking constitutional analysis either generally or on specific occasions. 
77. See Markup on S. Res. 138, S. Res. /48, S. Res. 178: Hearing Before the Senate 
Rules Committee, 108th Cor.g. (2003) (approving proposals to amend Rule XXII); Hear-
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members of the committees were ever present at the same time. 
A simple majority of a committee was present at only one hear-
ing, but no Democrats attended. 78 The special evening sessions 
designed to embarrass the Democrats featured only a few ex-
tended discussions about the constitutionality of Rule XXII. The 
committees produced no findings or reports, and neither the 
Congressional Research Service nor the Office of Senate Legal 
Counsel produced any official studies or reports to assist the 
committees. 
A second, more subjective standard is to examine the con-
sistency in members' statements or votes, particularly whether 
they would maintain their position if they were on opposite sides 
of the constitutional question before the Senate. This test meas-
ures the extent to which senators seeking change have argued in 
good faith. If a senator would support an argument only when it 
helps him, then one could fairly accuse him of inconsistency (as-
suming he has no credible explanation for his seemingly inco-
herent positions). This standard would have required asking 
whether the Republicans who favored the impeachment and re-
moval of President Clinton would have favored impeaching and 
removing a Republican president who had engaged in similar 
misconduct. The debate over Rule XXII has allowed us a decent 
opportunity to measure the consistency of many senators' posi-
tions on the constitutionality of the filibuster. In 1995, Democ-
ratic Senators Tom Harkin and Joseph Lieberman proposed 
amending Rule XXII almost precisely along the lines suggested 
by Majority Leader Frist.79 A joint commission subsequently 
ing on Senate Resolwion 151, Requiring Public Disclosure of Notices of Objection 
("Holds") to Proceedings to Motions or Measures in the Senate: Hearing Before the Senate 
Rules Committee, 108th Cong. (2003); Hearing on Senate Rule XXJ/ and Proposals to 
Amend This Rule: Hearing Before the Senate Rules Committee, 108th Cong. (2003); Judi-
cial Nominations, supra note 6. Interestingly, at no point in any of these hearings did the 
Republican majority address, much less reconcile its arguments with, the House's rule 
requiring a supermajority to approve tax increases. For a description of the rule, see 
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE UNITED STATES INCOME TAX: WHAT IT Is, HOW IT GOT 
THAT WAY, AND WHERE WE Go FROM HERE 286-88 (1999). See also Ackerman, et al., 
An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539 (1995) (critiquing the 
rule). Given the House rule and Rule XXII, one has to wonder whether there is anything 
the Senate may not do in the rulemaking process. The question is whether there is a 
point, even for defenders of the constitutionality of the filibuster, at which entrenchment 
becomes a constitutional difficulty within the legislative process. This is a big question, 
but a short answer, for purposes of this paper, is that the Senate may adopt any proce-
dural rule it wants as long as it does in accordance with its own rules. See Rubenfeld, su-
pra note 4, 87-88. 
78. See Markup, supra note 77. 
79. See Hearings Before the Joint Commission on the Organization of Congress, 
108th Cong. (1995); Ross Mackenzie, The Democratic Filibuster Invites "Systemic Col-
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studied the question, but the Senate took no action upon any of 
its recommendations. A decade later, every Democrat who had 
denounced the filibuster in 1995 changed positions to defended 
the constitutionality of the filibuster while every Republican who 
had defended the filibuster in 1995 changed positions to question 
its constitutionality. Thus, in debating the filibuster, most sena-
tors have been on both sides and appear to have succumbed to 
petty partisanship. 
There are several reasons for this failure. First, lower fed-
eral court appointments tend to have relatively low political sali-
ence.80 There is no evidence indicating the public is generally 
aware of lower court nominations. Second, united government 
(in which the same political party controls the White House and 
the Senate) generally lacks incentives for extended deliberation. 
Such was the case, of course, with 2003's filibuster debate. 81 The 
final reason for the failure is that we may be looking at the prob-
lem from the wrong angle. If we change our perspective, we 
might understand the failure to amend Rule XXII as simply the 
failure of the part~ seeking formal change to discharge its bur-
den of persuasion. 2 
lapse," RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, June 12,2003, at A17. 
80. Cf Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, The Increasing Senate Scrutiny of 
Lower Federal Court Nominees, 117 POL. SCI. Q. 259 (2002) (suggesting, inter alia, sena-
tors' scrutiny of judicial nominees has relatively low political salience except during peri-
ods of divided government). 
81. The proposal to amend Rule XXII went further through the legislative process 
in united than divided government. The Senate Rules Committee approved amending 
the rule in 2003, while no committee took any action on a similar proposal in 1995 in 
spite of a joint commission's inquiry. The reason is that with united government the party 
in power had an incentive to protect those interests of the presidency, which it considers 
to coincide with its own. There was no such overlap when the Republicans controlled the 
Senate during Bill Clinton's presidency. 
82. The Senate has taken no action yet on the proposed amendment of Rule XXII 
approved by the Rules Committee. The failure to act may signal different majorities, or 
perhaps the absence of any majoritarian preference, within the Senate. For instance, the 
absence of floor action may derive from a majority's support for the status quo, though 
its composition and the intensity of its members' preferences are far from clear. There 
may also be a majority that does not support the constitutionality of Rule XXII, though 
its composition, too, is unclear. A majority of senators may disapprove of Rule XXII, but 
for different reasons. It may also be possible that the proposed amendment has failed 
because the Majority Leader has not persuaded even his own side. There may even be a 
supermajority that favors amending Rule XXII in accordance with the rules but not 
along the lines proposed by the Majority Leader. A majority within the Senate may have 
figured the outcome of the effort to amend Rule XII was a foregone conclusion, but the 
members of this majority might have come to this conclusion for different reasons. The 
literature on the inherent difficulties of defining or clarifying majoritarian will is volumi-
nous. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982); KENNETH 
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). For a thoughtful 
work on the challenges that social choice theory poses for the concept of democracy as 
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A change in perspective might allow one to view Senate 
Rule XXII in an entirely new light. Rule XXII makes change dif-
ficult. It conditions change on widespread consensus. In the ab-
sence of such consensus, the default position is the status quo. 
The rule, in other words, facilitates stability within the system. It 
creates an enormously but not impossibly high hurdle for 
change. My research indicates that out of 79 proposals consid-
ered by the Senate over the years to amend the cloture rule, it 
has approved only six,83 but each time change occurred only in 
accordance with the supermajority voting requirements. A 
mechanism that encourages arguments to have broad, bipartisan 
appeal to effect change is another safeguard for ensuring the 
quality of constitutional debate within the Senate. 
The fact that no formal action has been taken to amend 
Rule XXII does not mean that the debate on its constitutionality 
is over. Inaction should not be confused with either indifference 
or the absence of discourse. The formal debates do not reflect 
the full extent to which the Senate engaged the arguments over 
the filibuster's constitutionality. Left out of this picture is the 
significant discourse about the constitutionality of the filibuster 
that occurred in numerous venues outside the Senate, including 
but not limited to party caucuses, visits with or speeches to con-
stituents, Senate hallways, the dining rooms, offices, telephone 
exchanges, network coverage, newspaper commentaries, and 
lobbying by interested parties (including academics). Senators 
are not nearly as restricted as judges in the range of information 
merely the implementation of pure majoritarian will, sec Richard H. Pildcs & Elizabeth 
S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and 
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121,2142 (1990). 
For whatever reason, no majority has emerged in support of the so-called "nuclear 
option" for amending Rule XXII. This option envisions a specific sequence of events un-
folding in a lloor proceeding on a motion to amend the rule. First the Democrats would 
initiate a filibuster (pursuant to the rule) against the motion to amend. Then the Majority 
Leader would ask the Parliamentarian [or a ruling on the constitutionality of Rule XXII. 
The Parliamentarian is expected to uphold the constitutionality of this rule, but the Ma-
jority Leader would appeal this ruling to the Presiding Officer, who is the Vice-President 
of the United States. The Vice-President, Dick Cheney, would overrule the Parliamen-
tarian, at which point the Democrats may appeal his ruling to the full Senate. At this 
moment things could implode within the Senate, for a majority could then claim the non-
reviewable power to affirm his ruling and proceed with amending the cloture rule as it 
sees fit. If a majority were to do this, the Senate as we have known it would likely cease 
to be. Almost all the Democrats would probably storm out of the Senate, and upon their 
return would undoubtedly deny unanimous consent for any measures desired by their 
Republican counterparts. 
83. The most significant alterations to the filibuster were made in 1917, 1949, 1975, 
and 1985. See DEMOCRATIC STUDY GROUP, SPECIAL REPORT: A LOOK AT THE SENATE 
FILIBUSTER, H.R. REP. NO. 103-28, at 1 (1994). 
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that they may take into account or even seek while deliberating 
constitutional questions. While the Senate has yet to take any fi-
nal action on the majority leader's proposal, one may safely as-
sume that there were a number of informal exchanges between 
the majority and minority leaders and their respective caucuses 
over the constitutionality of Rule XXII and strategies for main-
taining-or thwarting-the filibusters against the President's ju-
dicial nominations. This extensive discourse about the constitu-
tionality of Rule XXII cannot and should not be discounted in 
measuring the quality of constitutional discourse within the Sen-
ate. Such discourse is essential to meaningful deliberation be-
cause it constitutes the manner in which senators receive back-
ground information on a problem. It also is likely to enrich 
constitutional deliberation, because senators are likely to be 
more candid with each other behind closed doors and to avoid 
posturing for the media. This discourse is consistent with-and 
indeed has been encouraged within- the design of the Senate, 
even though the full extent of this discourse can never be known. 
B. NON-JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 
The other problem with Rule XXII is not unique to that 
controversy. It involves the weight, if any, of historical practices 
as a source of constitutional meaning. While the Supreme Court, 
for more than two centuries, has emphasized the relevance of 
historical practices for determining the constitutionality of a con-
tested action,84 some scholars might question its relevance. They 
point to the absence of any standard for identifying which prac-
tices ought to guide constitutional interpretation.85 The longevity 
of a practice arguably provides a dubious basis for its constitu-
tionality given that some longstanding practices, such as segrega-
tion, are generally regarded as unconstitutional. 
Critics of Rule XXII have been disposed to treat historical 
practices in at least two different ways. The first has been to re-
ject all or most historical practices as untrustworthy. Many peo-
ple, in fact, do no trust Congress to make altruistic judgments 
84. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding practice of legisla-
tive prayers that began in First Congress and spanned two hundred years); Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (noting that "an unbroken 
practice ... is not something to be lightly cast aside" by constitutional challenge); The 
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (noting that "[l]ong settled and established 
practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional 
provisions"). 
85. See supra 5 and accompanying text. 
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about its own power. Their concern is that the Congress will be 
prone to aggrandize its powers, particularly if its members know 
courts may defer to (and perhaps not even review) those prac-
tices. This concern might serve as a good reason for not allowing 
historical practices to be absolutely binding on either the courts 
or on Congress, but it does not justify depriving them of all con-
stitutional relevance. Institutional self-interest does not neces-
sarily yield to indefensible or even incoherent results. It might 
lead members of Congress to make judgments that increase pub-
lic confidence and stability, order, and efficiency within the insti-
tution. 
Alternatively, critics of the filibuster may construe historical 
practices as favorable to their position. Some point to vice-
presidential rulings and Senate votes in 1957, 1969, and 1975 as 
supporting their judgment that Rule XXII is unconstitutional. 
Yet, a closer look at the record indicates that the Senate rejected 
the arguments against the constitutionality of Rule XXII. 
In 1957, Vice-President Nixon declared that "he believed 
the Senate could adopt new rules 'under whatever procedures 
the majority of the Senate approves."'86 Nixon also stated that 
the Senate must determine for itself Rule XXII's constitutional-
ity. The Senate then proceeded to ignore Nixon's statement and 
to adhere to the requirements in the rule. Though Nixon reiter-
ated his belief about majority rule in 1961, the Senate once again 
ignored his declaration. The fact that he made this declaration as 
a lame duck might have increased the likelihood it would have 
been ignored. 
In 1967, Senator George McGovern proposed amending the 
cloture to require only a three-fifth vote of the Senate to invoke 
cloture. McGovern proposed ending debate on a motion to con-
sider his proposed resolution, and suggested he thought only a 
majority was needed to end this debate. Some construed his re-
quest as asking that proposals to amend Rule XXII be subject 
only to a majority vote to invoke cloture. Vice-President Hum-
phrey refused to comment on McGovern's request. Instead, he 
relied on a precedent allowing the Senate, rather than the Vice-
President, to decide constitutional questions. The Senate then 
voted to reject McGovern's proposal for ending debate 37-61, 
and then voted 59-37 to sustain a point of order raised by Sena-
tor Dirksen, who had challenged the constitutionality of 
86. CLOTURE RULE, supra note 29, at 29. 
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McGovern's motion. These votes are construed as finding 
McGovern's motion to have been unconstitutional. 
In 1969, the Senate again debated the constitutionality of 
Rule XXII. In the course of the debate, Senator Church asked 
the Chair whether a majority vote could invoke cloture. Hum-
phrey said, "yes," and then explained that "if a majority of the 
Senators present and voting but fewer than two-thirds vote in fa-
vor of the pending motion for cloture, the Chair will announce 
that a majority having agreed to limit debate on [the resolution 
under consideration,] to amend Rule XXII, at the opening of a 
new Congress, debate will proceed under the cloture provisions 
of that rule. "87 Humphrey acknowledged that this ruling was 
subject to appeal (to the Senate) without debate. The Senate ini-
tially voted 51-47 to invoke cloture, after which Humphrey de-
clared cloture had been invoked. The Senate then voted to re-
verse itself on appeal by a 45-53 roll call vote. The latter vote 
was understood at the time as the Senate's reverting to the two-
thirds cloture vote requirement. 
In 1975, the most confusing exchange (yet) over the consti-
tutionality of Rule XXII occurred, though it concluded with 
clear reaffirmation of the constitutionality of the rule. Senator 
Mondale proposed to amend Rule XXII to require only three-
fifths vote to invoke cloture. In the course of the debate over his 
proposal, he asked whether a majority of the Senate may 
"change the rules of the Senate, uninhibited by the past rules of 
the Senate?" Vice-President Rockefeller refused to answer the 
question, submitting it instead to the Senate for consideration.88 
Subsequently, Senator Pierson moved to consider Man-
dale's proposal and suggested a majority vote was sufficient for 
cloture. The Senate initially rejected 51-42 a point of order 
(raised by Senate Majority Leader Mansfield) against the point 
of order, perhaps signaling approval of Mondale's claim that a 
majority vote was sufficient to invoke cloture on proposed 
changes to Senate rules at the outset of a new session. After a 
break, the Senate took another vote, 53-38, to reconsider what it 
had done, and then voted 53-43 to sustain a point of order that a 
majority lacked the authority to amend Rule XXII. The Senate 
thus "erased the precedent of majority cloture established two 
weeks before, and reaffirmed the 'continuous' nature of the Sen-
87. !d. at 28-29. 
88. !d. 
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ate rules."89 After these votes, the Senate proceeded to take two 
additional votes as a likely compromise devised by Senator Byrd 
to allow for (1) an amendment to Rule XXII to require only a 
three-fifths vote to invoke cloture for all matters except for pro-
posed changes to Rule XXII and (2) preserving Rule XXII's re-
quirement of two-thirds to invoke cloture of a filibuster against a 
motion to amend Rule XXII. On March 7, 1975, the Senate 
voted 73-21 to end debate on Mondale's proposal to amend Rule 
XXII, and adopted the amendment later that day 56-27 (pursu-
ant to Rule XXII, which allows a majority to amend the rule). 
The fact that the Senate has invariably amended its rules in 
accordance with its rules carries enormous weight in the Sen-
ate.90 Indeed, senators have always recognized the influence of 
nonjudicial precedent. This sort of precedent includes historical 
practices, which in turn include past constitutional judgments at 
institutional and individual levels. At the institutional level, 
these practices include floor votes and committee votes on any 
matters, as well as parliamentary rulings (whether ratified, over-
turned, or not acted upon by the Senate ).91 These practices also 
89. CLOTURE RULE, supra note 29, at 31. 
90. See supra notes 59 and 83 and accompanying text. Proposals favoring cloture by 
majority vote were defeated in 1925, 1947, 1949, and in every Congress between 1961-
1975 with the exception of 1971 in which there was no vote on the question. See 
CLOTURE RULE, supra note 29; see also Complete List of Cloture Votes Since Adoption 
of Rule XXII, 32 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 317 (February 9, 1974). The rejections of pro-
posals favoring cloture by majority rule were particularly significant in the years in which 
the Senate rejected Vice-Presidents' rulings against the constitutionality of Rule XXII. 
Proponents of the measure popularly known as the "nuclear option" argue that 
there is precedent supporting for a simple majority within the Senate changing the Sen-
ate's rules regardless of any language or provisions within the rules to the contrary. They 
rest this assertion on the reasoning in a recent article published by one former and one 
current Senate staffer. Martin Gold and Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to 
Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Over Come the Filibuster, 
28 HARY. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 205 (2005). 
Gold's and Gupta's support for the "nuclear option" simply lack any merit. Perhaps 
most importantly, they acknowledge that "each time the Senate rules have been 
amended, the body has followed the rules-change procedures set forth in the rules them-
selves." The most pertinent precedent within the Senate is thus all against deployment of 
the "nuclear option." Gold and Gupta agree that the "nuclear option" would be un-
precedented. They recognize that the "nuclear option" would, if deployed, constitute a 
"new" precedent. It would constitute the first time in history in which the Senate devi-
ated from its practice of amending its rules in accordance with its rules. 
Gold's and Gupta's primary authority for the "nuclear option" consists of four in-
stances in which a majority of the Senate voted to resolve questions pertaining to Senate 
practices. None of the four merit detailed explication here. None involved approving 
anything remotely analogous to the "nuclear option," much less approving such an alter-
native. Each of these instances involved attempts to implement or enforce existing rules 
of the Senate. 
91. There are at least three compilations which purportedly contain references to, 
or excerpts from, the Senate's proceedings on all the matters that have come before it. 
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include the informal arrangements, traditions, and norms (such 
as senatorial courtesy) for doing business in the Senate. At the 
individual level is the recognition that each senator retains the 
authority to make his or her own constitutional judgments on 
questions that come before the Senate. Senators recognize the 
practical impossibility of enforcing a uniform standard on what 
the Constitution requires. Thus, senators historically have 
reached their own judgments about, for instance, the relevance 
of ideology in confirmation proceedings, the burden of proof in a 
vote on a presidential nomination, and the burden of proof and 
the rules of evidence in impeachment proceedings. The norma-
tive weight of nonjudicial precedent within the Senate thus de-
pends on the extent to which senators choose to defer or not. 
The normative weight of nonjudicial precedent outside the 
Senate is, of course, a different matter, and one over which the 
Senate understandably has limited control. The Senate may con-
trol the extent to which other authorities defer to its practices by 
providing persuasive authority. Thus, the Senate has an institu-
tional incentive to invest resources in creating and formulating 
nonjudicial precedent, so that other branches of government and 
the public have confidence in its constitutional judgments. 
As a practical matter, the officials in other branches remain 
free to disagree with either the outcomes of Senate proceedings 
or the bases for Senate action or inaction. Even then, there may 
be a cost to interfering with the Senate, particularly its internal 
affairs. One can, for instance, suspect but not prove that Presi-
dent Bush's administration strongly encouraged Republican 
senators to consider amending Rule XXII to ease the require-
ments for cloture. There is a fine line between encouragement 
and pressure, and senators, even the President's fellow Republi-
cans, may consider pressure from the White House to be offen-
sive. Even from a popular president, senators will not appreciate 
being told how to wield their institutional prerogatives. Such 
pressure, for instance, probably persuaded James Jeffords to 
switch parties. It eroded relations between Jimmy Carter and the 
Democratic senators he had urged to adopt merit selection pan-
These compilations include Hind's and Riddick's Precedents as well as Senator Robert 
Byrd's treatise. on Senate practice. While useful, none of these works is exhaustive; they 
do not cover either all conceivable subjects or all the possible material that could be rele-
vant to a particular subject. For instance, none has any material on, or any references to 
discusswns of, censure of Presidents or other high-ranking officials. At best, these books 
are useful starting. points for research on how the Senate has handled procedural, legisla-
live, and conslitulional questions. 
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els (and thus diminish the extent to which he would have de-
ferred to senatorial courtesy in judicial nominations). It had no 
effect when the Republican-controlled Senate refused to adopt 
President Bush's suggestions during the midterm elections of 
2002 on the scheduling of committee and floor votes on judicial 
nominations. 
There are three other ways in which nonjudicial precedents 
may affect the constitutional decision-making of other branches. 
First, they may function as one of multiple modes of discourse 
about the Constitution. Just as judicial precedents comprise an 
argumentative mode within constitutional adjudication, institu-
tional and individual judgments on constitutional questions en-
able the senators themselves and other branches to engage in 
Constitutional argument. Precedent can be defined broadly 
enough to encompass the constitutional judgments of courts and 
Congress. In this manner, historical practices of the Senate may 
influence, but not bind, constitutional decisionmaking by other 
branches. 
The second way in which nonjudicial precedents may be ac-
corded some weight by other branches is the extent to which his-
torical practices may be construed as serving the same institu-
tional interests as precedents do within the courts. Justices defer 
to their own past decisions, apart from their merits, because they 
facilitate consistency, stability, predictability, and reliance on the 
Court.92 Senators will defer to past practices within their own in-
stitutions for similar reasons, and to the extent these concerns 
matter to the other branches, nonjudicial precedent may be ac-
corded further respect outside the legislative process. Indeed, 
there is a point at which non-judicial precedent encompasses 
matters that courts should simply avoid altogether. Each of the 
considerations that is relevant for determining whether some 
contested practice is nonjusticiable-whether the Constitution 
commits the challenged discretion solely to some nonjudicial au-
thority and the need to achieve finality, to avoid embarrassment, 
and to give another branch its due respect-provide further evi-
dence on nonjudicial precedents.93 
92. See generally Michael 1. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Deci-
sion-making and Theory, 60 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991). These concerns matter to the 
Court in part because they are important to the parties in the lawsuits adjudicated by the 
Court. Concerns about stare decisis provide, inter alia, notice to litigants about the rules 
of the game in constitutional adjudication. The Senate's rules, along with the Constitu-
tion, make up the rules of the lawmaking game. 
93. On the political question doctrine, see generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Su-
preme than Court?, The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial 
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Another obvious way in which senators may try to get other 
branches to defer to its practices is through the confirmation 
process. Through the exercise of its advise and consent power, 
senators may try to staff the federal judiciary, the executive 
branch, and independent agencies with people disposed to defer 
to their preferred interpretive methodologies, which may include 
a robust deference to both judicial precedent and nonjudicial 
precedent. 
In the context of the filibuster, nonjudicial precedents have, 
and ought to have, significant weight. The filibuster falls within 
an area in which the Constitution clearly invests special power 
within the Senate-namely, to devise the rules to govern its in-
ternal affairs. The Senate's procedural rules matter most to the 
Senate itself, and the institution has devoted considerable re-
sources to their maintenance, including a full-time Parliamentar-
ian and the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel. The Senate has 
also considered the constitutionality of the filibuster several 
times.94 Each time it has squarely upheld the constitutionality of 
the filibuster. If a court were to have followed a similar pattern, 
most people would be inclined to think that overruling prece-
dent was not just becoming increasingly difficult, but well-nigh 
impossible. There is no reason to think differently about the 
Senate's posture on an issue it has repeatedly embraced. 
As a practical matter, none of this means that the filibuster 
is immune to amendment. There is always the option of amend-
ing Rule XXII in accordance with the rules, a past course which 
has proven fruitful in lowering the number of senators required 
to invoke cloture. Even apart from challenging the filibuster on 
constitutional grounds, a senator could question the coherence 
of the filibuster as policy. In the meantime, the starting point for 
any discussion of the merits, or constitutionality, of the filibuster 
is not a blank slate. The Senate's historic practices constitute a 
serious obstacle to its dismantlement; they effectively create a 
rebuttable presumption of constitutionality. The fact that this 
presumption remains intact demonstrates yet again how en-
trenchment is a feature of the legislative process. 
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 248-53 (2002); Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering 
NonJLtstlctabtluy: JudlClal Rev1ew of Impeachment After Nixon, 44 DUKE L.J. 231 (1994). 
94. See supra notes 60 and 78 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
The filibuster may be an unusual and occasionally or even 
frequently disagreeable legislative practice, but it is not unconsti-
tutional. First, it is a rule for debate that the Senate has been 
constitutionally authorized to adopt pursuant to its power to de-
vise procedural rules. Second, the filibuster has been an unbro-
ken practice within the Senate, one that has been ratified ex-
pressly and implicitly on a repeated basis since the founding of 
the republic. While there may be good reason not to defer com-
pletely to popular practices, there is good reason to respect an 
institution's repeated and consistent judgments about its author-
ity in an area of special expertise. Deference fosters stability, 
predictability, reliance, and consistency in Senate proceedings. 
Third, the Constitution does not exhaust the full range of su-
permajority voting requirements that the Senate may adopt. It 
sets forth only the mandatory minimum of such requirement, 
and leaves the discretion within the Senate to adopt procedural 
rules that may (but need not) require supermajority approval. 
Fourth, even if the filibuster violates majority rule, the Constitu-
tion does not establish majority rule as a fixed, inflexible princi-
ple within the legislative process. It is, instead, the default rule to 
be followed in floor votes. Fifth, the filibuster is not unconstitu-
tionally entrenched. The anti-entrenchment principle is applica-
ble primarily to lawmaking; it is designed to prevent a legislative 
majority from binding future majorities by means of ordinary 
legislation. The anti-entrenchment principle applies to proce-
dural rulemaking when a legislative body, such as the House, 
must reconstitute itself at the outset of each new session because 
every member stands for re-election in any given cycle. The anti-
entrenchment principle is designed to vindicate the interests of a 
new majority extracted from the entirely new body that will then 
determine the rules under which it wishes to operate. The Sen-
ate, unlike the House, has no constituency that corresponds to 
the new majority within the House, or, for that matter, the entire 
House. It never has a need to reconstitute itself at the outset of a 
new session because only a third of its members stand for re-
election in any given cycle. The remaining two-thirds of the Sen-
ate continue their terms from one legislative session to the next. 
The Senate is a continuing body with standing committees and 
rules because it never lacks a sufficient number of members in 
order to do its business. Sixth, the filibuster does not violate a 
President's nominating authority. It does not bind a President to 
the will of a minority of senators any more than a majority's re-
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peated rejections of a President's nominees binds the presidency 
to its will. Seventh, the filibuster is a plausible commitment by 
the Senate to facilitate institutional stability and order. 
Of course, none of these reasons insulates the filibuster 
from modification. Rule XXII places the burden on the party 
seeking change to make a broad, bipartisan appeal. In the ab-
sence of such an appeal, the filibuster persists. It reflects the 
Senate's longstanding respect for minority views and the equality 
of its membership; it provides senators with a voice that might 
not have the same volume in an institution (such as the House) 
in which the majority is in total control. The filibuster has had 
the salutary effect of counterbalancing some of the other coun-
termajoritarian features of the Senate, such as the committee 
system, by enabling individual senators to block legislation or 
nominations favored by a committee or to force different nomi-
nations or changes in legislation rejected by a committee. The 
filibuster has the additional salutary effect of encouraging the 
President and the Senate to find common ground. With regard 
to nominations to an independent branch of government such as 
the judiciary, the filibuster encourages the President to make 
peace with the Senate by nominating individuals who can garner 
consensus. The need to find such common ground should not be 
discounted, especially with respect to judicial nominations. 
Entrenchment of the filibuster supposedly violates the prin-
ciple that a current legislature may not bind the hands of a future 
one. Yet, confirming an article III judge does just that. While a 
majority conceivably might be able to undo a policy that is in ef-
fect, no subsequent legislature has the power, short of the ex-
traordinary process of impeachment and removal, to undo the 
confirmation of an article III judge.95 It is therefore especially 
important that any nominees for article III judgeships be sup-
ported, if at all possible, by more than a bare-bones majority so 
that the public at large-and not only members of the party in 
power-will respect the edicts of federal judges. Filibusters are a 
useful way of checking and balancing the desire of a temporary 
majority to pack the federal judiciary with lifetime appointees 
picked, at least in part, on the basis of their devotion to the po-
litical agenda of the party in power. It is not bad policy to re-
quire supermajority approval of someone who will wield signifi-
cant power within our system of government long after the 
95. See U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 2, cl. 5; id. art. I,§ 3, cl. 6; id. art. III,§ 1. 
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dissolution of the majorities which brought into power the Presi-
dent who nominated him and the Senate that confirmed him. 
Finally, the debate over the need to reform the cloture rule 
has discounted a significant safeguard against using the filibus-
ter. If the majority's will were frustrated, the Constitution pro-
vides two remedies. The first is to provide a president with the 
power to make recess appointments96 and thereby circumvent 
the obstruction of a substantial minority of senators. The second 
is to allow the President and those who have supported his con-
tested nominations to exact revenge through the political process 
or to seek common ground to resolve their differences with a 
substantial minority of their colleagues. Whichever path they fol-
low is constitutional, just as constitutional as the filibuster itself. 
96. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 3 ("The President shall have Power to fill up all Va-
cancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions 
which shall expire at the End of their next Session."). Interestingly, this clause demon· 
strates that the Framers knew how to provide a limit to authority that could bind a legis· 
lature from one session to the next if they had wanted to do so. It also raises an interest-
ing question whether a president may place someone on an Article Ill court through a 
recess appointment. Formalism, or requiring each exercise of governmental power to be 
an exercise of some express authority, might lead one to doubt whether someone without 
the special protections accorded by Article III may nevertheless exercise Article III 
power. Functionalism, which calls for balancing competing considerations, would likely 
lead one to uphold the practice, because it has been employed by most presidents (in-
cluding George Washington) who sensibly construe the clause's language referring to "all 
Vacancies" as applying to all vacancies. 
